Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through the control of physical space.
Introduction
Two US wars in the Middle East have lead to talk of an American Empire (Johnson 2001 (Johnson , 2004 Bacevich 2002; Ferguson 2004) . In stark contrast to traditional patterns, however, the United States appears to have no desire to actually acquire more territory. The question of whether empire requires physical expansion and colonization, or simply "effective control" of another society (Doyle 1986 , page 30) is one of continuing controversy. 1 Whether US motives and practices are imperial, hegemonic, or something else 2 seems to us to be a definitional debate subject to the usual difficulties of arguing assumptions. 3 We seek instead to focus on behavior, offering an explanation that ties together the rise and fall of territorial expansion with the current US penchant for influence rather than acquisition. The United States and other developed nations exhibit little of the traditional preoccupation of powerful countries with obtaining land and resources through force. Indeed, the appeal of colonial holdings manifestly evaporated by the mid-twentieth century. Rather than reflecting an exception to traditional imperial behavior, US efforts represent a secular change in the imperatives of power; owning land or minerals matters much less than guiding the global commons.
Change and continuity are perennial substitutes. Processes trend (Kant 1957 [1795 ], Hegel 1900 [1837 , Fukuyama 1992), or they recur in cycles (Toynbee 1961 , Huntington 1993 . Patterns can be used to exemplify international affairs, and possibly identify causes, though basic questions remain about which patterns events follow when, and why. One of the great transitions of the modern world has been the growth and decline of European empire. The cycle of imperial expansion 1 Ferguson (2003c, pages 160-161 ) prefers empire to hegemony for reasons that seem to confuse concepts with variables. "To compare . . . the United States and the United Kingdom as hegemonies is to miss differences that become obvious when the two are compared as empires." Distinguishing between US hegemony and British empire would in fact highlight the differences Ferguson emphasizes without muddying the conceptual waters. "A century ago, the United Kingdom's formal empire was very large indeed, covering nearly a quarter of the world's surface and ruling roughly the same proportion of its population. Today, on the other hand, the United States' formal empire includes just 14 dependencies (of which the largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,000 square kilometers."
2 President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela recently claimed in the United Nations that the US was lead by "the devil." 3 The vocabulary of social science, though perhaps not the substance, is constructed; terms are what the community defines them to mean. As such, the only objective basis for comparison of definitions is their utility as concepts.
and decay is readily discernible (c.f. Gibbon 1993 Gibbon [1776 , Spengler 1932 , Modelski 1987 ) but, while "imperialist" acts may remain common, the richest nations show little enthusiasm for continuous administration of foreign territory, as opposed to attempting to influence, discipline, or intimidate foreign sovereigns and polities. Have we seen the end of territorial empire or can we expect that the future will repeat historical patterns of imperial expansion and decay, "all over again"? The question is far from academic. Territorial expansion perhaps characterizes the historical pattern of rising powers better than any other behavioral attribute. If we are to believe in "American
Exceptionalism," then we may have to conclude that the future of international relations will be much like the past. The eventual ebb of US power will also bring a close to the exception. China, for example-with many unsatisfied territorial claims-may use its rising military potential to expand at the expense of its neighbors. Alternately, the Chinese may find that expansion in the modern world is best accomplished by proxy, ensuring that other countries conform to instructions from Beijing, rather than actually having to gobble up, and administer, increasingly marginal territory.
We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization based on the dynamics of military technology and economic development. Random technology shocks create military advantages that gradually decay as insights or equipment disseminate, or as countermeasures are developed that degrade military advantage. Military technology shocks by themselves can explain the cycle of empire, but not the secular trend away from territorial expansion. A second feature, economic development, has lead nations gradually to prefer commerce to conquest. Capital accumulation makes empire expensive, shifting incentives away from "stealing" inputs to production and toward influencing the terms of trade. A third element explains the timing and rapidity of decolonization.
Conquest imparts political control that invites the vertical integration of economic processes. Mercantilism in turn impels other countries to acquire or maintain colonies in order to access markets and inputs to production. The imperialist dilemma is reversed once influential actors terminate mercantilist policies, allowing other countries to abandon empire as well. The theory predicts that territorial empire is archaic. Power in the modern world derives from productivity, rather than from raw materials. The lust for land could return, however, if inputs again become scarce, if military technology lowers the cost of occupation, or if key systemic actors fail to foster free global markets.
Literature: Tropes of Empire
Lasting for over three centuries, the age of European empires profoundly shaped the modern world.
The classical practice of territorial expansion virtually ended soon after World War II, but the political institutions and economic processes of the often contrived nations that were formed to manage abandoned territorial holdings are heavily conditioned by their colonial pasts (c.f. North 1981; Acemoglu, et al. 2001; Spruyt 2005) . The historical importance and far-reaching implications of imperialism have lead to profound criticism both during (Hobson 1938 (Hobson [1905 , Lenin 1970 Lenin [1916 , Orwell 1950 , Sartre 2001 ) and after its formal practice (Said 1993 , Johnson 2001 Chomsky 2003) . Considerable attention has also focused on the consequences of decolonization (Darwin 1988 , Betts 1998 ). Yet, while many scholars examine the origins of empire (Smith 1981 , Scammell 1989 , Canny 2001 , Black 2002 , its practice (Gollwitzer 1969 , Cain & Hopkins 1993b , or demise (Motyl 2001; Galtung et al. 1980; Galtung 1996; Springhall 2001) , little attention has been devoted to reconciling historical cycles of expansion and decay with the secular, and precipitous, termination of territorial acquisition among major powers in the late twentieth century. 4
Imperialism is among the most germane and ambiguous topics in international relations. Concepts are at once intuitive and divisive while conclusions are salient for both policy makers and ordinary people. For precisely these reasons, however, controversies drive analysis as much or more than processes. Discussion of an American empire in particular has ebbed and flowed in recent decades with every shift in global power (Schlesinger 1986 , Kennedy 1989 ), a variable landscape of international actors (Bacevich 2002) , and the fortunes of US foreign policy (Johnson 2001 (Johnson , 2004 Ferguson 2004 ). Nor certainly is this a uniquely American question. Other nations act on, and respond to an evolving logic of hierarchy (Lake 1996 , Cooley 2005 . Much of the world's population is affected by US policies, even as the fate of humanity itself may depend on whether the rising Asian powers follow historic, contemporary, or novel practices in their conduct of foreign affairs.
4 These arguments place little emphasis on moral suasion in inducing political change (Crawford 2002) . The view that empire ended because of a normative social evolution (Spruyt 2000) risks tautology or wishful thinking. Imperial polities showed considerable willingness to overlook moral qualms prior to decolonization. At the very outset of European empire, a debate in the Catholic Church lead to the requirement that conquistadors read aloud the encomiendo-the Church's guarantee of protection for all peoples who embraced the "true faith"-before the natives could be put to the sword. Of course, legalistic niceties don't always bear their intended fruits, as indigenous peoples typically did not understand Spanish, and were in any case were reluctant to abandon cherished traditions.
Explanations for Imperialism
Theories often seem to come in threes. Explanations for empire focus on the demand of the metropolis for riches, resources, markets, or jobs, on the supply of targets for conquest, or on system-level factors that condition colonial opportunities or demand. Hobson (1938 Hobson ( [1905 ), Lenin (1970 Lenin ( [1916 ) and others claimed that the imperial impetus comes from over-extended capitalism. 5 Snyder (1991) views instead political and military elites as the cause of empire, while jingoistic propaganda deceives the masses. The latter explanation also has the added virtue of fitting premodern imperialism. Dependency theorists shift the emphasis to political tensions and economic incentives on the periphery (Gallagher & Robinson 1953 , Dos Santos 1970 , Galtung 1971 , Caporaso 1998 ). 6 Agents co-opted by the metropolis undermine developing nations. A third category of argument involves structural theories from realists (Waltz 1959 , Gilpin 1981 to Marxist historians like Wallerstein (1979) to long cycle theorists (Modelski 1987; Modelski & Thompson 1988; Goldstein 1988; Thompson 1988; Chase-Dunn & Rubinson 1979; Chase-Dunn et al. 2000) . 7 Empires expand or contract in an organic fashion, responding in an unending cycle of world power or prosperity.
Explanations for Decolonization
Scholarship on the end of empire can also be grouped into three analogous categories. Some researchers emphasize domestic incentives arising in the colonial power (Kahler 1984 , Holland 1985 .
The metropolitan interpretation argues that colonialism is no longer justified in terms of economic or social burdens on the colonizer. The will to rule gradually dissipates among key domestic political constituencies. A second perspective emphasizes colonial resistance and/or the decline of the European educated "comprador" class of native elites as a cause of decolonization (Easton 1964 , Grimal 1978 , Low 1991 . Finally, other researchers favor international factors, such as the effect of the Japanese overthrow of the European colonial system in Asia during World War II, or the rise of the anti-imperialist superpowers after World War II (McIntyre 1977 , Lapping 1985 .
Putting Together Growth and Decay
Students of world affairs have long been interested in the rise and fall of great powers (c.f. Gibbon 1993 Gibbon [1776 , Mahan 1987 [1890 ], Mearsheimer 2001 . Again, three schools of thought offer insights.
The World-Economy approach has been particularly influential in conjunction with the dependency school of international political economy (Dos Santos 1970 , Frank 1972 . Inequality varies between core and periphery (Wallerstein 1974 (Wallerstein , 1983 Galtung 1971; Gidengil 1978; Chase-Dunn & Rubinson 1979; McGowan & Kordan 1981; Rasler & Thompson 1983) . Economic stagnation and the need for innovation are associated to imperial conquest, while booms lead to decreased interest in colonial holdings. Though long economic cycles are in the "drivers seat," the world-economy model generally ignores costs associated with colonial occupation, especially opportunity costs.
Economic determinists (Marx 1975 (Marx [1853 , Hobson 1938 Hobson [1905 , Lenin 1975 Lenin [1917 ) stress that imperialism is the inevitable product of capitalist expansion. Changes in the global economy and decolonization forced the need to emphasize socio-economic transformations in the colonialized and post-colonial periphery (Gallagher & Robinson 1953 , Magdoff 1969 , Moran 1978 . As with the World-Economy approach, however, Marxist thinkers do not take into consideration the cost-benefit trade-off faced by imperialist powers and do not explore in detail forces driving decolonization.
A third intellectual tradition, institutionalism, emphasizes instead political and social factors as the determinants of imperial growth and decay (Strang 1990 (Strang , 1991a . The rise of an anticolonial political discourse and the diffusion of Western democratic institutions to colonized countries are said to trigger decolonization. However, even if these political factors heavily influence the specific varieties of European imperialism and decolonization, one must still question what led discourse on decolonization to become "ripe." In the absence of a logic of salience, institutionalists face a heavy burden in explaining the long presence and impotence of anti-colonialist ideas, as well as their sudden ability to gain political purchase. The rapid process of decolonization, in a context of relative economic, but not political decline in Europe, suggests the salience of an economic logic in creating a moment of opportunity for the institutionalist argument. Indeed, as the other two approaches make clear, there is a sense that the colonial enterprise is fundamentally an economic one, driven by economic conditions, even when other factors (social, strategic, ethical) play significant roles.
While the three perspectives discussed offer important insights about the process of colonial expansion and demise, each is less convincing in explaining the timing of empire and the rapid collapse of the colonial system after Word War II. Interestingly, while two of the classical schools of thought emphasize economic interpretations of imperialism and decolonization, neither applies basic notions of incentive compatibility to the study of the subject. Even though these approaches stress the importance of economic factors, entry and exit decisions are not rooted in a logic of economic optimization. Instead, the beginning and end of empire are said to result from politics.
Relatively few studies explore the micro-foundations for colonial expansion. According to Grossman & Iyigun (1995) , investments in colonies were potentially very profitable due to monopoly rents, provided that the risk of insurrection was low. Increasing the insurrection technology or size of local populations could make colonization unprofitable, eventually triggering decolonization (Grossman & Iyigun 1997) . Oneal & Oneal (1988) also show that colonial investments were profitable, while Frieden (1994) argues that approaches to investment and colonial control were interrelated. 8
Another set of studies discuss economic incentives in the context of conflicting domestic interests in imperialist countries. Empire and decolonization are explained in terms of power relations among beneficiaries and those harmed by colonialism (c.f. Cohen 1973 , Kahler 1981 , Kimura 1995 , Garoupa & Gata 2001 . 9 These forces may be intensified by the rate of domestic economic change (Kahler 1988) . Similarly, economic conditions may set the optimal size of polities and incentives for secession (Bolton, et al. 1996; Alesina & Spolaore 1997 Lake & O'Mahony 2006) . Still other possible causes derive from cultural traditions within the metropolis (Pagden 1995 , Armitage 2000 , though the fact that culture varies from state to state suggests the need to explain the historic continuity of imperial aspirations and effects. We seek to address both the incites of many perspectives and a key shortcoming in the literature, explaining why the era of imperialism started in the 16th century and ended after World War II. More importantly, we reconcile recurrent cycles of empire (European and others) with a more general secular trend away from territorial acquisition in the modern era.
8 British capital flowed to middle-income countries (not poor) because of a better risk-return ratio (Clemens & Williamson 2000) . See also Pollard (1985 Pollard ( , 1987 , Temin (1987) , and Balasubramanyam (1989) for a debate on profits.
9 For a debate on "gentlemanly capitalism," see Cain & Hopkins (1980 , O'Brien (1999 O'Brien ( , 2000 , White (2000) .
Territory Ain't What it Used to be: Cycles and Trends
We offer a theory of the flow, ebb, persistence and demise of territorial empire that focuses on three factors. First, exogenous military technology shocks create the opportunity to reallocate territory through conquest. Second, economic development creates a secular decline in the value of territory, while increasing the labor costs of occupation. Finally, occupation tends to encourage mercantilist economic policies, in turn increasing incentives for other nations to acquire colonies. We also examine other factors likely to influence the durability of empire, including political liberalization of the metropolis and the effects of resistance movements and nationalism among colonies.
Military Technology: Getting to Know Shock and Awe
Anecdote and logic suggest that the advent of empire is closely tied to the ability and incentive to project power (Fuller 1945; McNeill 1963 McNeill , 1984 McNeill , 1998 van Creveld 1989; Dupuy 1990 (Buzan & Herring 1998 , Krause 1992 , Goldman & Andres 1999 , Goldman & Eliason 2003 . 11 Unless the imperial power continues to innovate, it eventually experiences relative decline (Gibbon 1993 (Gibbon [1776 , Kennedy 1989 , Gilpin 1981 . As one British historian describes, "we had a comparative advantage as an island seapower. It was then enlarged and sustained because we secured the further comparative advantage of being the world's first industrial nation. These advantages first shrank and then disappeared" (Low 1991, page 6 ).
10 It is easy to overemphasize technology, or confuse its contribution to power projection with combat effectiveness. For discussions of the continuing importance of leadership, politics, and personnel see, Dupuy (1979) ; Millett, et al. (1986) ; Stam & Reiter (1998b , 1998a ; Reiter & Stam (2002) ; Rotte & Schmidt (2003) ; Biddle (2004); Lieber (2005) .
11 Parker (1988, pages 118-120) discusses strategic military interplay between colonizers and indigenous populations. "The logic of Western superiority in fixed encounters had been thoroughly digested by the Indians: after their costly initial defeats, they were scrupulously careful to avoid pitched battles-much to the fury of the Europeans-because they always lost them. Only gradually did the Europeans recognize that the only way to beat the Indians was to adopt those same guerilla methods... But the Indians of New England were also learning fast" (1988, page 119) .
European expansion and colonization takes place in the context of dramatic increases in the administrative, transportation, and military technologies of European states (North & Thomas 1973 , Bean 1973 , Tallett 1997 , Abernethy 2002 . This transformation, and its consequences for European politics, are discussed elsewhere (c.f. Wallerstein 1980 , Hobsbawm 1987 , Tilly 1992 , Schroeder 1994 . Accounts of the origins of these technology shocks vary. Some authors argue that harsh competition pushed European powers to develop more powerful arms and armies (c.f. Downing 1992, Rogers 1995 , Parker 1988 , Boyd-Graber 2004 . 12 Others emphasize financial innovations which permitted powerful armies, and particularly navies (Ferguson 2002 , Glete 2002 . Still other research identifies a symbiosis in which states promoted a European state system, which in turn privileged states (Spruyt 1994 ). For our purposes, however, the particular origins of these technological and administrative changes can be treated as exogenous. The critical task here is to explain why recurring revolutions in European military affairs first propelled adventurers, then conquering armies, to distant places and, equally important, why this impetus then ebbed and later evaporated.
The cyclical nature of empire (Gibbon 1993 (Gibbon [1776 , Kennedy 1989) , and of military advantage (Rasler & Thompson 1983 , Holsti 1991 , are well established, if somewhat stylized, empirical facts. 13 What is less well understood is whether there exists variation in the motivation for empire. Some scholars argue that the urge to conquer is ubiquitous, occurring in all nations at all times and held in check only by the lack of technological advantage or martial expertise, or alternatively by mutual deterrence (Morgenthau 1948 , Mearsheimer 2001 . In contrast, one can characterize the impetus to empire as particularistic, housed in the aspirations of individual leaders, and thus more the stuff of historians and biographers than social scientists. We conceive of the preference for territorial aggression as a variable driven by environmental conditions that can recur or trend over time.
A second aspect of military innovation involves specialization. Armies can be used to fight and win wars against other armies, or to control the populations and territories of subject places.
Winning at war involves massing military power against critical elements of an opposing force (Jomini 1971) . Controlling civilian populations involves exerting limited force in many places at 12 Thompson (1999) contrasts demand side arguments with variability in the supply side (the ease of conquest). 13 Structural realists (Waltz 1959 (Waltz , 1979 , power transition theorists (Organski 1958 , Organski & Kugler 1980 , hegemonic stability theorists (Gilpin 1981 , Olson 1982 , and long cycles theorists (Doran 1971 (Doran , 1989 Doran & Parsons 1980; Modelski 1987; Modelski & Thompson 1988; Goldstein 1988 ) all see power as temporally bounded.
once. Innovations in military technology presumably influence the classic elements of firepower, mobility, and protection (Liddell Hart 1946) . While the last two elements increase the ability of a military force of a given size to exert combat power and to control a populated space, the first factor leads optimal force structure in different directions. Heavy (strategic) bombers and capital ships are poor tools for crowd control. The logic of conventional war increasingly demands large allocations of capital-relatively small numbers of soldiers on a battlefield with lots of expensive equipment. In contrast, the logic of conquest and control calls for "old fashioned" labor-intensive force structures-lots of soldiers with relatively little capital-intensive equipment. The divergence of optimal force structures should mean that sophisticated militaries, armies that tend to win the wars they fight, should be less and less effective as occupiers. To the degree that the determinants of battlefield and colonial effectiveness differ, and to the extent that resources available to the military are finite, nations contemplating colonizing another country must choose between a military that is optimized for combat (and thus more likely to capture and defend empire), and a force structure optimized for occupation (and thus more likely to make empire profitable and sustainable).
Economic Development: When Empire Pays (and When it Does Not)
One of the central debates in the study of imperialism is over whether (or how much) nations profit from empire (Liberman 1996; Brooks 1999 Brooks , 2005 Ferguson 2003b ). While a number of studies provide evidence that colonies were a net economic benefit, at least over certain periods (Fieldhouse 1973; Wolff 1974; Marseille 1984; Offer 1993; Ferguson 2003a) , scholars remain divided in their reading of the "balance sheet" of empire. 14 In a very real sense, however, this debate is instrumental to our objectives in explaining the basic imperial dynamic. We note simply that colonial conquest offered a perceived benefit to sovereigns or other key decision makers. Subsequently, the value of empire declined. If colonial holdings were never profitable (we doubt this), then rising costs of control, or declining benefits from markets or resources would eventually make clinging to empire prohibitive. Alternately, if empire was never a net drain on the imperial exchequer (we doubt this too), then plummeting profits must still weaken the forces of colonialism and embolden opponents.
14 See, for example, Davis & Huttenback (1982 , Cain & Hopkins (1987 , 1993a , Porter (1988) , O'Brien (1988) .
Social forces within the metropolis (i.e. democracy) or in the colony (i.e. nationalism) could also have tipped the balance sheet, but we discuss these later. The critical point for our analysis, which appears to be widely accepted, is that the benefits of empire declined over time (Doyle 1986 ). Nations, like firms or individuals, supply their wants through some combination of theft and production (Tilly 1985 , Hirshleifer 1989 . Stealing is appealing when and if taking is more lucrative than making or trading (Olson 1993) . Theft is cheaper than purchase or production when the technology of stealing (call this appropriation) is relatively high, when the inputs to appropriation are relatively abundant, and when the product of appropriation is relatively scarce. Within borders, muggings and other property crimes tend to be committed the unemployed and otherwise unskilled (Strasburg 1978 , Sullivan 1989 . Governments attempt to reduce the appeal of private theft by limiting access to the technology of appropriation (regulating gangs and firearms, for example), by improving the productivity of unskilled labor (schools, vocational training), and by reducing the expected benefit of stealing (police and prisons) (Becker 1968; Fajnzylber, et al. 2000) .
Unfortunately, the international system lacks some of the tools available domestically to discourage appropriation (Grieco 1988 , Lake 1996 . Across international borders, governments or populations attempt to deter aggression by making conquest expensive (defense) or occupation unprofitable (nationalism, "scorched earth" policies). Nations cannot alter the peaceful productivity of foreign labor, however, and only occasionally can one country affect another nation's appropriative technology. International incentives for choosing production over predation thus depend heavily on environmental conditions, and on exogenous change (Hirshleifer 1978 (Hirshleifer , 2001 . If, for example, the productivity of labor rises, particularly among those countries with the best appropriative technology, or if labor becomes scarce in these economies, while capital abundance drives down incentives to appropriate limited capital in one region with expensive labor from another region, then this should lead countries capable of conquest to no longer covet colonial holdings.
The question of whether to trade or take is one civilizations confront continuously (Andrews 1984) . Indeed, the two processes are linked. Vikings, remembered as the marauders of feudal Europe, were also the chief merchants (Deutsch 1944) . After robbing the churches and great houses, they often established trading posts and settlements, where less lucrative goods were bought and sold for the broader European market (Sawyer 1972 , Jones 1984 , Kurrild-Klitgaard & Svendsen 2003 . Bank robbers often have bank accounts, while mobsters and petty criminals typically rob one person in order to pay another. Criminals must actively participate in the "legitimate" economy in order to maximize the benefit of their criminal activities. Identifying how nations profit from particular combinations of trade and theft constitutes a critical element of the logic of empire. 15
The Imperialists' Dilemma: Mercantilism Made Me Do It
Imperialism creates a special opportunity for states to engage in anti-competitive economic behavior (Viner 1948 ). The metropolis is in a position to determine whether trade will be allowed with thirdparties (c.f. Porter 1994 , Williams 1972 , Irwin 1991 , Ward 1994 . These incentives extend beyond the colonial holdings of one particular country when vertically integrated mercantilist economies effectively limit the growth of non-imperialist countries. Barriers to market entry in foreign colonies and to access for raw materials encourage countries to adopt mercantilist policies and seek colonies.
Beggar-thy-neighbor colonial policies, similar to those that helped to hobble European economies in the Great Depression (Strange 1985 , Goldstein 1986 , Simmons 1997 ) ensured that other industrializing powers needed to consider acquiring colonial holdings to gain access to markets and resources. Once some colonial powers were willing to prevent other nations trading in the growing hinterland of rising European power, other nations were forced to decide whether to play the same game (capturing markets). The mad rush to conquer the remaining unclaimed portions of the globe followed, not so much because every property was profitable, but because staying home ensured no payment, and further limited market access. The process of territorial "crowding out" reversed itself once the predominant power no longer sought markets through colonial occupation.
Preliminary attempts by the United States to acquire its own colonial holdings suggest that Americans were not morally or culturally opposed to empire (Mahan 1987 (Mahan [1890 , LaFeber 1963).
Instead, relatively late industrialization meant that the US had a comparative advantage in a free market system, while colonial expansion threatened war with major European powers (Van Alstyne 1960 , Zakaria 1998 . Hegemony allowed the United States to hasten the end of the imperial age.
Modeling Imperialism
We construct three versions of a game-theoretic model of imperialism: a basic model of the effects of military technology and economic development, a model of domestic political liberalization, and a third model that examines the role of system effects (mercantilism) in perpetuating empire. Supplyside arguments (nationalism, colonial populations) are modeled by varying the cost of appropriation.
We begin with two actors (N, S) that can represent tribal groups, countries, or regions of the world.
Historical circumstances place N as the Northern imperialist countries and S as the Southern colonized countries, but we believe that the model is general and can address other time periods.
The Basic Model
We can think of the potential for colonization as "lumpy." A critical mass of fighting technology and labor is necessary before a state can achieve any result. Warships and adventurers were needed before European powers could discover, and then conquer, the "new world." Even neighboring states must acquire some minimal level of capabilities to engage in territorial aggression. We can incorporate the possibility of a threshold in the model by assuming that appropriative activities are only possible if the fighting technology ρ is higher that some arbitrary level ρ. More formally, the restriction ρ > ρ ensures that a state does not project power until the threshold has been exceeded.
The production functions for actors N and S are displayed as equations (1) and (2) below:
where y = production output, L = labor allocated to domestic production, K = physical capital stock, α, β = total factor productivities, and where a, b, c, d = exogenously determined parameters.
Each group, state, or region can choose how much of their labor to allocate to production and how much to allocate to appropriation or defense, subject to a constraint normalized to one:
where F = time devoted to appropriation, D = time used for defense, and where i ∈ [N, S].
Imagine that N develops a technological advantage. Historically, this turning point might have begun in the late feudal period when ideas and technology from the Muslim world diffused into Europe and sovereigns began to consolidate political and military power. At this stage neither N nor S had reached the technological threshold for colonial conquest (ρ S < ρ N < ρ). 16 Around the 15th century, however, N reaches the threshold, while S remains below the threshold, ρ S < ρ < ρ N . 17
In the age of imperialism, ρ S < ρ. S cannot colonize N . Accordingly, S always chooses F S = 0.
Thus, the time constraint of S becomes L S + D S = 1. Since N will not be attacked by S, N chooses D N = 0 and its time constraint becomes L N + F N = 1. Thus, we have asymmetry in the incentive structure of the two players in the model. This simplifies analysis and reflects actual conditions.
Colonizing an opponent entails appropriating land and physical capital, assets that are valuable but which may be bought or stolen. Equation (4) shows the payoff (utility) function for actor N :
where ρ = the fighting technology (0 < ρ < 1), θ = a parameter (0 < θ < 0.5).
N 's payoff equals its production output, plus what capital and territory it "steals" from S. 18
The parameter θ refers to the decisiveness of fighting effort. If θ = 1 2 , appropriative activities are perfectly effective in determining distribution, whereas if θ = 0, time spent on appropriative activities has no effect on the distribution of benefits. We also include a friction of fighting effort (1 − ρ). Improvements in fighting technology (higher ρ) make appropriation less inefficient by reducing "the fog of war." Another way to think about this is that N has less to lose in fighting S.
Fighting technology (ρ) can be seen as an increasing function of the total national factor productivity, denoted α. We assume that ρ is a concave function of α, as increases in the general technology level of a society result in less than proportional increases in fighting effectiveness. Technology requires military specialization, which optimizes force structures for battlefields versus riot control or 16 Muslim caliphates had extended their rule to Spain in the West and eventually to the gates of Vienna in the East. Crusaders held key fortifications in the Holy Land, Malta, and elsewhere (Partner 1998; Lewis 1982 Lewis , 1995 .
17 While civilizations attained technology exceeding this threshold locally, overseas empire was a modern innovation. 18 For additional details and a similar contest-success-function to the one adopted here, see Rohner (2006) .
counterinsurgency (Black 2000) . 19 Factors such as muscle power and the morale of personnel are also effectively fixed. Thus, doubling a country's weapons less than doubles the country's military strength. A functional form that reflects this reasoning is ρ = kα γ , where k=constant, 0 < γ < 1. 20
Introducing a time constraint and solving for first order conditions, we get N 's reaction function:
where L * N = the optimal level of L N , and other variables or parameters are as described.
N 's optimal level of production increases with its own total factor productivity, and decreases in the effectiveness of N 's fighting technology. Not surprisingly, productivity increases encourage greater domestic production, while increases in military power make appropriation more appealing.
The net effect of production technology on labour time is positive, however, as productivity increases less than proportionally increase a state's fighting technology (ρ is a concave function of α).
The payoff function for player S is displayed below:
Including the time constraint and setting the first derivative equal to zero, we obtain:
As expected, S's defense effort increases (lower L S ) with N 's colonization effort (lower L N ).
The first and second waves of European colonization (Latin America, Asia) can be explained using the basic model outlined above. The third wave of colonization is also addressed by system effects discussed later in the text. As illustrated in Figure 1 , territorial empire is initially constrained
19 Though many countries can acquire advanced weaponry, an ever smaller proportion of states are able to integrate military technologies effectively (Biddle 1998) . Asymmetric warfare (Van Creveld 1991 , Holsti 1996 is the comparative disadvantage of forces optimized for conventional battle (i.e. British "red coats" in the American Revolution).
20 Following Boulding (1962) and others (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita 1981), we could also imagine that fighting technology decays in the distance between the metropole and the colony:
The greater the distance between two countries, the greater will be the dead weight loss associated with appropriation. One could assume a specific functional relationship such as is used in "gravity" models of trade: (1 − ρ) = ωd 2 , where ω is an exogenous parameter. As our focus lies elsewhere, we do not treat the friction loss of appropriation in more detail. by threshold conditions. The level where domestic production technology reaches this first threshold (such that ρ N > ρ) is labelled α 1 . Incentives for empire then decay gradually with increasing productivity. Finally, the rapid collapse of the third wave of colonization, where V F < V P holds, is labelled α 2 . This second threshold involves fixed costs that are detailed in appendix A. the pursuit of empire once threshold capabilities are achieved. As productivity continues to increase, however, and capital accumulates, incentives to appropriate decline (N prefers making to taking).
Hypothesis 1
The effect of economic development on territorial empire should be strictly concave, first increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood of a country possessing colonial holdings.
The incentives for empire should also increase with military technology, though with a declining marginal product. Advances in weaponry, logistics, transport, and communications initially increase a nation's appropriative potential, but technological advantages diffuse, while additional effort does not yield equivalent increases in appropriative capacity. Militaries optimized for battle against other sophisticated armies are also comparatively ineffective in exerting colonial control.
Hypothesis 2 The effect of military technology on territorial empire should be positive but declining, increasing appropriative potential at a diminishing marginal, spatial, and temporal rate.
Political Liberalization
It has been argued that European democratization, which took place in the interwar period and after World War II, was a critical cause of decolonization (Kahler 1984 , Snyder 1991 , Strang 1992 ).
Below, we model possible effects of political liberalization on the decline of empire. We leave it to the empirical analysis to determine whether democratization constitutes a compelling explanation.
Appropriation and production decisions do not result from a plebiscite. Leaders and key political supporters may receive intense benefits from appropriation, even if empire is not socially optimal for the country as a whole. In the model below, the task of the government is to choose and impose a unified level of labour L which can be more or less close to socially optimal levels, but which is eventually adopted by both the population and the elite. This politically optimal level is found by optimizing equation (8), the payoff function for the government of N , with respect to labour L.
where V GN = payoff function of the government of N , φ = relative weight attributed to the collective payoff function of the population, V P N = payoff function of the population of N , V EN = payoff function of the ruling elite of N , ζ = parameter capturing the costs of political instability.
The government cares about the payoff function of the population, as the leader would like to avoid losing popular support and wants to stay in power. However, it also cares about the payoff function of the ruling elite, as also their support is needed for staying in office and as the government receives a part of the rents captured by the elite. The relative weight of the two payoff functions depends on the level of democratization (M ). As a regime becomes more democratic, the weight attributed by the leader to the utility of the population increases. Thus, φ = φ( + M ). We would of course need a theory of democratization to fully endogenize φ in terms of other parameters or variables. Making φ exogenous to the model serves our purposes here and simplifies exposition. 21
We also model the risk of political instability due to distributive conflicts that occur if relative 21 Development is widely viewed as a key determinant of democracy (Lipset 1959; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski & Limongi 1997; Przeworski 2000; Boix & Stokes 2003; Epstein, et al. 2006 ). The bias introduced by treating democracy exogenously is not a serious problem here, as it favors a relationship that we find does not exist.
payoffs of V EN and V P N are quite different. This is captured by the term ζ(V EN − V P N ), which we can represent as ζ(V EN − V P N ) rather than in absolute values, ζ |V EN − V P N |, assuming conventionally that elites are richer, more productive, and can more easily capture rents from colonies:
Elites had better access to business relationships (Cain & Hopkins 1993a) and to political power (Snyder 1991 
where
Taking the first order conditions (setting the first derivative of V GN with respect to L equal to zero), we obtain equation (10) displaying the level of labour chosen by the government:
The East India Companies founded in several European nations, for example, were surely more profitable for elites than for the rest of the population (Marx 1975 (Marx [1853 , Glamann 1958 , Chaudhuri 1978 , Keay 1991 , Adams 1996 .
23 For claims that democracies are not less imperialistic, see Haas (1995) ; Galtung (1996) ; Henderson (2002) . Spruyt (2000 Spruyt ( , 2005 critiques moral sentiments arguments in favor of his own claim of normative change on the periphery.
24 This assumption can be relaxed without altering any of the key results, but the mathematics are less tractable.
The first thing to note about equation (10) is that for x P N = x EN the result for L * GN is just identical to the result that was obtained before in equation (5):
It is also interesting to see that the impact of the threat of political instability is to increase the weight attributed to the population's payoff. Thus, increases in ζ have exactly the same effect as increases in φ. By choosing a level of L that is closer to the population's optimum, the inequality between elite and population can be reduced, which decreases the government's loss from political turmoil.
Whether democratization (higher φ) leads to a higher or lower L * GN depends on the relative size of L * EN and L * P N , where
We previously made the assumptions that the elite is richer (K EN > K P N ), more productive (α EN > α P N ) and that elites extract more of the rents from any colonies (ρ EN > ρ P N ).
The first two assumptions imply that x EN > x P N , while the third assumption implies that y EN > y P N . Whether on the whole L * EN is greater or smaller than L * P N depends on the relative size of the wealth-productivity effect on one hand (x EN versus x P N ) and of the rent-extracting effect (y EN versus y P N ) on the other. If the difference in terms of wealth and productivity between the elite and the population is not that large (x EN is only slightly bigger than x P N ), but the rentextracting capacity of the elite is much bigger (y EN >> y P N ), then L * EN < L * P N . This implies that democratization (a larger φ) reduces colonization, as the greater weight of L * P N increases L * GN . 25
From the first half of the 20th century on, perhaps, colonies already produced net losses. However, colonial holdings could conceivably have continued to profit members of the ruling classes.
As shown in Appendix 1, rapid decolonization can be explained by economic factors alone. Yet, political liberalization in Europe could also have played a role. What mix of factors triggered decolonization-economic development, military technology, or democratization-requires empirical assessment. Results from the domestic politics model suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Democracies should be less likely to possess (or to seek to acquire) colonies.
25 An interesting twist of the argument above is that economic conditions influence the impact of democracy.
Economic development results in higher values of α EN , α P N ,ρEN , ρP N and increases accordingly the variables xEN , xP N , yEN , yP N . These four variables do not necessarily increase at the same pace. Thus, the net effect of democracy on colonization varies over time and depends on the level of development. It is conceivable that democratization can even increase imperialism in certain periods. We will explore these implications in future research.
Accounting for System Effects
The logic of empire is conditioned in part by collective action. The structure of the global economy is affected by the choices of multiple nations. While free markets are socially optimal, individual states often have incentives to engage in anticompetitive policies (Conybeare 1987 ). Countries may pursue or perpetuate colonial holdings if the colonies of other countries inhibit free trade or capital.
Parsimonious models often explain particular features of a process, while omitting others. Different models also reflect competing perspectives in the literature and allow us to compare the implications of different assumptions. Here we relax the assumption of a single imperialist country, including two players N 1 and N 2, that compete over access to a poor country S. We use the Nash equilibrium solution concept to solve this single-shot game. Each imperialist country chooses between producing (L) or fighting (F ), with total time for each player normalized to 1.
Equation (12) displays the payoff function of country N 1 (N 2's payoff function is analogous):
where A = marginal productivity of labour, B = potential marginal gains from trade, ψ = parameter related to the decisiveness of the fighting effort (with 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 0.5), ρ = the fighting technology (0 < ρ < 1), and λ = a parameter related to the defensive technology of player S.
Equation (12) has the same overall structure and the same main features as equation (4) in the basic model. However, since including a second colonial power increases the complexity of the model, we simplify other aspects of the model structure in order to keep the model tractable. These simplifying assumptions are not critical to, and do not alter, the main results of the model.
The payoff for country N 1 is composed of three elements. First, there are returns on productive activities, which are increasing in the parameter A. Second, there are gains from trade that increase in the parameter B and in the portion of country S that is controlled by N 1, (
Treating S as divisible can be seen as the portion of the developing world controlled by a given imperialist power. Mercantilism attempts to restrict trade with a given colony to the colonial power. Thus, if one country (N 1) acquired all of S, N 2 would not trade. The portion of country S that is colonized is represented by (1 − λD S ), which is a similar, but slightly simpler formulation than under equation (4). The part of this colonized fraction of S that is controlled by N 1 and that can be used as an exclusive trade partner is specified by the difference-form contest success function ( direct benefit, the portion of K S gained, and in an indirect benefit, the possibility of trading with one's colonies. This profit of appropriative activities is balanced against the opportunity cost of imperialism, which is the income of productive activities forgone in order to pursue competition.
Introducing players' time constraints (11) into N 1's payoff function (12), we get equation (13):
Setting the first derivative of equation (13) with respect to L N 1 equal to zero and expressing the result in terms of L N 1 , we find the optimal value of L N 1 displayed in the reaction function (14).
The solution is analogous for player N 2. Note that these are the results for an interior solution.
Corner solutions follow from the fact that neither variable can become negative,
As equation (14) makes clear, the proportion of labour time N 1 devotes to production increases in its productivity (A), and decreases with a more attractive target (higher K S ). These findings are both consistent with, and different from, the model in the last section. Systemic competition creates "imperialist" arms races. The more time a rival imperialist power spends on productive activities (higher L N 2 ), the more time country N 1 devotes to production. Conversely, when country N 2 puts time effort into fighting, country N 1 does so also. The systemic/mercantilist version of the model shows that structural (systemic) attributes influence decisions of empire. In particular, the colonization effort of one imperialist power has a conflict-enhancing effect on its rivals:
Hypothesis 4 A country is more likely to hold colonies when the system contains many colonies.
The strategic interaction between the two imperialist countries N 1 and N 2 is illustrated in mercantilism to capitalism and free trade is reflected by a gradual decrease in this parameter γ.
An (almost) entirely capitalist world economy would correspond to an infinitely small level of γ. 27
We introduce the possibility of partially free trade, by changing equation (12) into (12') below:
All variables are defined as before, in particular A still represents the gains from production and B still corresponds to the gains from trading the produced goods. As mentioned, the parameter γ can be interpreted as the level of mercantilism (γ = 1 would be a fully mercantilist regime).
Naturally, the results for γ = 1 are identical to the results presented in the basic model. By contrast, γ = ε (where ε is an infinitely small positive number) corresponds to a "nearly perfect"
capitalist system, where trade is independent of colonial possessions or non-market influences.
27 With γ in the denominator, the reaction function (14') would become undefined if γ = 0. Treating free trade as an arbitrary absolute that is only approximated empirically also makes sense in light of historical evidence. At the dawn of the 21st century and after several rounds of the WTO, trade is still far from free of tariffs and other barriers.
Introducing the time constraint (11) in (12') and computing the first-order conditions, we get:
We can evaluate the effect of mercantilism and capitalism on incentives for imperialism and decolonization by looking at the first derivative of L N 1 with respect to γ. A negative first derivative implies that more capitalism (lower γ) increases the incentives to produce (higher L N 1 ) and accordingly reduces the incentives to fight (lower F N 1 ) to gain or retain control of foreign territory or markets. The first derivative of L N 1 with respect to γ becomes negative, if condition (15) holds:
Condition (15) holds when the gains from production (A) and the gains from trade (B) are each large relative to the product of S's capital endowment, the fighting technology of N 1 and N 2, and the pivotal nature of warfare. In the post-World War II period, the steady decay of barriers to trade, the relative poverty of developing countries, as well as the rise of nationalist insurgency movements made colonialism less appealing. Changes in the global economy had by the early 20th century created conditions in which the economics of colonies, and the vertical integration of production networks, were increasingly ineffective. Sources for raw materials proliferated. Great Britain, for example, lost the monopoly on natural rubber, while synthetics were also invented (Reisz 2007) .
At the same time, rising costs for skilled labor in the domestic economies of colonial powers, and a growing sense of nationalism among colonial subjects, made it more difficult to administer territorial empire. The ascendance of the United States as the leading economic, and then political, power also created tensions between the interests of the previous and present hegemons (Louis 1987) . US promotion of freer global markets further degraded the economic advantages of empire. Similarly, the evolving world economy initially increased, and later decreased, incentives for territorial empire.
Hypothesis 5 A country is more likely to hold colonies when the hegemon has many colonies.
Hypothesis 6 The effect of systemic development on territorial empire should be strictly concave, first increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood of a country possessing colonial holdings.
Research Design and Data
While our arguments potentially apply to broad swaths of history, as well as to the future, our empirical analysis is limited to the last two centuries (1816-1992) due to data availability. We believe, however, that the tests detailed below lend considerable external validity to the theory.
Our unit-of-analysis is the country year. We examine both dichotomous (presence or absence) and ordinal (count) indicators of colonialism/decolonization. For the dichotomous dependent variable, we rely on ReLogit (King & Zeng 2001a , 2001b . 28 We use negative binomial regression to estimate the number of colonies a country holds. We correct for spatial dependence in states using Huber/White robust standard errors. Independent variables are lagged by one year to limit the effects of endogeneity. We also use Beck, et al. (1998) splines to control for duration dependence.
Dependent Variable
The dichotomous and count versions of the dependent variable come from two sources. Rather than attempt to recode cases and risk biasing relationships in favor of our hypotheses, we use the data "as is," in effect biasing against our hypotheses . Ravlo, et al. (2003) collect data on colonial status to use as an independent variable in analyzing democratic disputes with former colonies. These data match more closely the sample of independent variables, many of which are obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) project, or are collected and organized to conform to these data. 30 That the two data datasets, each of which are independently coded using different criteria, yield equivalent results suggests further support for our findings.
28 Results are equivalent using logit. A Stata "do" file that replicates the analysis is available from the authors. 29 Colony data from Paul Hensel's ICOW project do not at present include the start date of colonial dependency. 30 Van Belle (2006) questions the dependence of quantitative international relations research on canonical datasets.
Independent Variables
• Economic development: The most common measure of development is population weighted GDP. These data are only widely available from the 1950's, however, which would prevent an analysis of colonialism. Two variables serve as effective proxies for per capita GDP (Lipset 1959; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Hegre et al. 2001 ): 1.) Energy Cons./Pop. comes from the COW National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset of total annual fuel consumption in coal-ton equivalents (Singer et al. 1972; Singer 1987; Correlates of War Project 2005) . 2.)
Iron & Steel/Pop. measures the quantity of iron or steel produced by a country each year.
• Military Technology: No convention exists as to the measurement of military technology. Dupuy (1979 Dupuy ( , 1987b pioneered an approach where each weapon was given a score by a lethality index, then other factors such as dispersion and force size were used to determine an army's overall combat potential. • Democracy: Polity data provide two eleven-point indexes of regime type based on formal constraints on the executive (AU T OC) and institutional support for democracy (DEM OC) (Jaggers & Gurr. 1995 , Gurr et al. 1989 . We combine the Polity variables democ and autoc as follows, [(democ i -autoc i ) + 10]/2, (where i ∈ [A,B]). We add 10 to make all values non-negative and divide by 2 to yield a 0-10 range consistent with Polity variables.
• National Capabilities: Effort may be a substitute for military technology. Power relations also figure prominently in international relations theory (Claude 1962 , Levy 1983 , Sullivan 1990 ).
31 Military historians find Dupuy's use of numbers objectionable. See also Brown (1986 ), Dupuy (1987a .
32 COW provides military spending data in nominal (current year) British pounds and US dollars . To compare values across time, we converted these data into a common currency (dollars), and then to real (2000) values. We used GDP deflators from EH.net, (URL: http://eh.net/hmit/), documented in (Johnston & Williamson 2005; Officer 2004 Officer , 2005 . Additional details are available from the project's STATA "do" file.
We assess capabilities using the COW Composite Indicators of National Capabilities (CINC) score, computed as the average of a state's share of total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, and military personnel and defense spending.
• Major Power Status: Major powers tend to be more active internationally. It has also been argued that powerful states seek colonies for symbolic reasons (Veblen 1917) . Since major powers may be more prosperous, there is a danger that the relationship between development and colonies might be confounded by major power politics. We include a dummy variable, Maj. Power, coded (1) is a state is a major power according to the COW project listing.
Analysis
The results of our analysis of development, technology, hegemony, and colonies are summarized in two tables containing eight regressions. Each of the six regressions listed in Table 1 estimates the probability that an independent nation possesses at least one colony. Succeeding models introduce additional variables to examine other hypotheses, address specification, or to evaluate robustness.
The main objective of Model 1 in Table 1 is statistically significant and positive. Both development variables remain largely unaffected, but
Military Technology 2 is now insignificant and so has been removed from this and subsequent models.
Adding the interaction term divides the impact of military technology between an "independent" negative effect and a positive "crossover" effect attributable to economic development.
To better understand these relationships, it will help to look at a picture. as we travel first up onto the piano/mesa/boat, and then down again onto the floor/valley/water on the right side of the figure. Notice also that the transition to and from colonialism is abrupt.
While we cannot reject Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 (or support Hypothesis 3 ), we have yet to examine the systemic and hegemonic effects outlined in the remaining hypotheses. Models 4 and 5 in Table 1 introduce variables for the number of colonies held by the hegemon (Hypothesis 5 ) and the number of colonies in the system (Hypothesis 4 ). Both hypotheses appear to be supported. 34
Model 6 completes Table 1 by introducing variables to evaluate systemic development, the effects of the United States as hegemon, and to control for factors relevant to the systemic variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 6, Sys. Energy/Pop. and its square reveal a concave relationship between systemic development levels the appeal of colonies. Development initially leads to systemic predation as states compete to capture resources and markets. These incentives reverse themselves, however, as the gains from production (A in the formal model) increase with development and the gains from trade (B) grow with the size of the world economy. Similarly, the appeal of colonization 34 A variable coded for the proportion of territories that are colonies ( colonies colonies+countries ) yields equivalent results.
appears to ebb with increases in US productivity, though the strength of US opposition appears to be declining. As the chief proponent, and beneficiary, of free trade in the twentieth century, US possessed few incentives to prop up the European colonial system when it became hegemon. We add # States in System and # Major Powers to evaluate and control for the effects of changing system structure and size. Having more major powers increases incentives for territorial empire, either because there is competition among major powers, or because of collective action problems in enforcing norms of free trade and territorial integrity. The number of states in the system is negatively associated with colonialism, which is compelling given that the two are rough complements.
What is surprising, then, is that the relationship is not stronger. In any case, initial findings for the state-level hypotheses (with the exception of regime type) appear robust to systemic variables. The logic of empire is at once cyclical and secular, systemic and state-based. Military innovation can appear anywhere, at any time, and change the calculous of make or take. In contrast, longterm trends in economic development are readily discernible and have led to an important, possibly permanent, decline in the appeal of empire. Finally, a hegemon can accelerate or delay systemic transitions by influencing state-level incentives to pursue protection through territorial control.
Is colonialism or territorial empire permanently departed or will it someday return. Skepticism is strong in international relations; it might seem unlikely that the tradition of territorial aggressiona tradition as long as history itself-is today at an end. If instead the post-World War II period was just a lull, then we need to know when, where, and how territorial empire will reappear.
The lust for territory as a historical process ended among the developed and powerful nations as it became cheaper to make than to take, and as the global mercantilist system gave way to relatively freer trade. Each of these processes can be reversed, though each is not equally likely to suffer a reversion. The great depression of the 1930's (and World War II) delayed decolonization, but today colonies would have to be re-aquired, adding substantial fixed costs to the expenses of imperial administration. Empire is appealing when the technology of appropriation is high, domestic labor is abundant relative to domestic capital, and when global markets are not functioning effectively.
Today, none of these conditions hold in the developed world, nor are they likely to change.
In contrast, the desire to control land, rooted labor, and minerals has never departed from the developing world. The poorest nations still covet territory, but often lack the capacity to project power beyond their borders. In places where labor is cheap and abundant and capital is expensive, colonial expansion or other activities designed to increase the pool for rents will remain appealing. Efforts at development may have the effect initially of increasing territorial aggression if the primary inhibiting factor is the military technology threshold ( ρ). The Middle East, where military technology is advanced relative to domestic production, is among the most conflict-prone regions in the world. Development in Africa could yield more capable, and disputatious states. An increase in state-level incentives for empire could happen if the number of "middle tier" economies increases, potentially overwhelming the current system of territorial prohibition. Similarly, technological changes might again increase the ability of the most advanced nations to take rather than make. Efforts to build combat robots, for example, could lower the cost of occupation, encouraging a return to territorial empire. Similarly, dramatic price increases in certain critical geographically localized commodities (such as oil), perhaps in conjunction with political instability that threatens stable access, could spark efforts at imperial control. This danger could be greatly Empire seem in fact to be advocating US leadership. To the degree that our results suggest an important role for the hegemon, we can support a very limited form of the pro-Empire argument.
However, much of the advocacy is overblown and confused. Critics, too, seem to exaggerate the continuity between present US policies and previous empires. There is something different about how American treats territory, but unlike President Bush, we prefer to explain this change in terms of the changing nature of production rather than as a result of irreproducible American virtues.
A Modeling Appendix
The modeling appendix deals with increasing returns to scale. The size of empire is at issue;
provided that it makes sense to engage in colonization at all, how much empire is a state likely to pursue? A standard way to model and think about increasing returns to scale is to include a fixed cost. Here the cost W is included whenever a positive level of colonization effort is chosen by N .
Equation A.1 below displays the utility function for some positive level of colonization (L N < 1):
First-order conditions are identical to (5). With no colonization (L N = 1), the utility is simply:
The country N will only choose positive levels of colonization effort if V F − V P > 0. If the condition V F − V P > 0 initially holds, but does not hold for a larger α, this could explain the rapid decline of imperialism after World War II. The expression V F − V P is re-written below:
The first derivative of (V F − V P ) with respect to α can be simplified as:
A derivative of ∂(V F −V P ) ∂α < 0 could explain rapid decolonization. The sign of the derivative is ambiguous, but can become negative for small values of α, a, b and K N and for big values of θ, ρ N , and K S . As some colonies were abandoned, administering remaining colonies was more expensive.
